If 1789 was the defining event of the modern political imagination, it remains to be seen what place will be given to the anticommunist revolutions of 1989. On the one hand, the 'long' 1989 running from Gorbachev's rise to power in 1985, or the reforms which he initiated soon afterwards, to the end of the USSR in 1991 marks the end of the Cold War which, we should never forget, could easily have killed us all. As events in global risk management go, it doesn't get much bigger than this. On the other hand, a number of commentators have stressed the absence of really new ideas in the 1989, especially after the rapid eclipse of civil society movements like Solidarity in Poland or Civic Forum in Czechoslovakia; Habermas, for example, has called it the 'catching-up' or 'rectifying' revolution; a return to democracy (and capitalism), and to the 'normal' path of post WWII European development. 2 Similarly, the 'new world order' proclaimed by President Bush I was already looking threadbare long before the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001.
In Europe, what had begun as a reaction to the consequences of nationalism in the two world wars had been developing gradually and haltingly into a new political model: an 'ever closer union' of more and more European states. The ultimate destination or finalité of what has become the European Union remains more or less as unclear as when Andrew Shonfield (1973) examined it in his Reith Lectures in 1972. Briefly, however, the EU is incipiently postnational, despite or because of its continuing symbiotic relationship with its member-states. It is post-imperial, in that however much it might superficially come to resemble the Austro-Hungarian Empire it will surely retain principles of democracy more characteristic of the national state (Beck and Grande 2004) . And it is perhaps (and this is part at least of its appeal), the beginning of a form of post-European cosmopolitan democracy attractive not just to Europe but to many other parts of the world. Jürgen Habermas (1991) has aptly described this as 'Europe's second chance'. The continent or subcontinent exported not just political and cultural modernity, which on the whole people want, and capitalism, which they either want or see as inescapable, but also a nation-state structure which, whatever may be said in its favour, was clearly also responsible for war and genocide. Wherever we might want to locate Europe on the spectrum between 'top of the world class' and the disruptive world bully deserving exclusion, its balance sheet in the second half of what we eurocentrically call the second millennium is at least ambiguous.
2
I shall return to this theme at the end, after looking more closely at 1989 and postcommunist transition. There is a further dimension to an inquiry into 1989. A long-standing lament in the philosophy of social science is that the problems of the social sciences, their low level of development relative to the natural sciences and their relative lack of what Giddens called 'revelatory power' can be partly explained by the impossibility of experimentation, except at the most trivial and small-scale level. Without going into the details of those debates, we can at least welcome the fact that communist and postcommunist Europe does offer something like an experimental situation: Stalinist 'socialism in many countries' after 1945, followed by postcommunist transition more or less rapidly after 1989. The two processes differed of course in that Stalinisation was supposed to be a more or less homogeneous and homogenising process (as reflected in the German slogan: 'learning from the Soviet Union means learning to win'). Divergencies such as the abandonment of agricultural collectivisation in Poland were seen as dangerously deviant (and sometimes invoked to explain the weakness of socialism in Poland). Postcommunist transition, by contrast, was supposed to be a process of liberation towards a set of freely chosen alternative futures -which makes the degree of observed convergence interesting in itself.
1989, then, raises issues of the periodisation and explanation of the origins of what Jowitt (1992) called 'the Leninist extinction'. There are substantial disagreements over the role of dissidence and the relative importance of revolution from below and implosion or state collapse (or mutation) from above. This in turn raises the even more fundamental and wide-ranging question, which I shall concentrate on here, of how exceptional 1989 was in the chronology of post-communist transition. On one reading, which I tend to favour, it was the fore-runner of what has happened or is likely to happen relatively soon in the rest of the originally communist world. We might take issue with Havel's Eurocentrism, but the important point, I think, is his notion of a shared postcommunist condition, in the particular way in which he defined it, 6 and a continuity between the earlier and later phases of the transition.
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We do not know, I think, either as analysts or as policy-makers, how optimistic or pessimistic to be about this situation, or about where the line between genuine and pseudo-democracies is likely to fall in the coming years. What we can do, as well as following current developments as closely as possible, is to look back over the period from 1989 to the present and at the interplay between what the biologist Jacques Monod (1970) called chance and necessity (see also Sarotte, 2009: 210-14) . In three at least of the 1989 revolutions, sheer accident played a crucial part. The best known is the opening of the Berlin Wall, which rapidly escalated into its destruction. Another is the rumoured death of a demonstrator in Prague on November 17 th . In the event,
like the premature announcement of the opening of the Berlin Wall, it escalated instead into the unexpected success of the revolution. This was a provocation by the secret police, who caused one of their own undercover agents to 'die', in the hope that this would provoke the crowds into actions which would justify a crack-down by the police and the authorities. 7 And if President Ceausescu had realised how the rally on 22 December would turn out, with the crowds not cheering but jeering, he might have chosen instead to give a fireside TV speech.
As Havel's reflections suggest, the most fundamental question is perhaps the analysis of 1989 itself. To cut a long story short, if we see 1989 less as a victory for the people and more as the outcome of strategies adopted by elites to preserve their position by other means, the less the contrast with the post-Soviet scene. Looking from the West, we tend to ask why the East has so far 'failed' to achieve liberal capitalism and democracy. Looking from China, the question is perhaps a different one: why did communist elites in the Soviet bloc fail to retain power while embarking on a necessary marketisation of the economy? 8 It is clear, I think, that we need to keep both lines of analysis, top-down and bottom-up, in play at the same time. And we should avoid assuming necessary differences, dictated by geography or political culture, where there is more like an interplay between structures and contingencies.
There are models for this sort of analysis in, for example, Theda Skocpol's States and Social Revolutions. Skocpol stressed the interaction between social pressure from below and state crisis at the top, and she also, though only in a footnote, noted that '…social-scientific analyses of revolutions almost never…give sufficient analytic weight to the conjunctural, unfolding interactions of originally separately determined processes (Skocpol, 1979 : 320, quoted in Sewell, 2005 . Looking further back, among the first social theorists to address the theme of the intersection of structural factors and contingencies was Montesquieu. 9 Tocqueville is also relevant here, and his methodological reflections on writing the history of the times remain highly pertinent.
7 Garton Ash (2000:438) 8 (Sassen, 2008: 12 ). In the postcommunist case, I suspect one would have to think in terms of multiple strata of 'winners': some entrepreneurs, some reformist politicians, some intellectuals and so on. The sites too would be multiple: stock exchanges and business schools certainly, but also educational organisations and programmes sustained by Soros and other NGOs. 11 See Chalmers Johnson (1970) and Tőkes (1997: 109 ' and 'bad' 12 In the original models of convergence popular in the 1950s and 1960s, the alleged process was seen as being driven by the functional imperatives of industrial society. In the 1990s, convergence was driven by external imperatives, varyingly identified as globalisation, the influence of outside advisors (Wedel, 1998) and the increasing influence of the European Union (see Outhwaite and Ray, 2005: chapter 4) . In Germany, of course, there was a more or less immediate implantation of Western practices (Thumfart, 2002) , and the EU was present from an early stage (Spence, 1991) . 13 There is a useful critical discussion by Jeffrey Klopstein (2009). First, there is the question who 'you' are. In Poland and Hungary, there was a fairly well established counter-elite, whereas in Czechoslovakia there was not much more than a cluster of dissidents with a penumbra of sympathisers. As Havel (2007: 55) puts it, 'we had no entr'acte of perestroika or reform communism, but we started 14 There are of course important and controversial issues here about the role of dissidence across the bloc in the run-up to 1989. See for example Wydra, 2007. directly, after a few days of revolution, to build a normal democratic society'. On the other hand, however, as Wheaton and Kavan (1992: 117) Here, then, is one of the less 'pacted' transitions in the bloc, and even here the continuities are striking. The Czech experience may suggest caution in taking too pessimistic or conspiratorial a view of transitions further to the east.
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What then were the options in 1989? I shall mention here only two obvious ones, 'no-brainers' if you like; the abolition of the secret police and of central planning of the economy. Even for the first of these, however, the demobilisations in Central Europe took a month or more and, in the case of the German Stasi, a massive demonstration (Sarotte, 2009: 96-7) . At the other extreme is the outlying case of Belarus, where the KGB has not even been rebadged, as in Russia, but proudly continues under its old name. In the Czechoslovak case, interestingly, Havel (2007: 106) explains the fact that it took a month to disband the StB as follows:
The secret police had countless buildings, both known and unknown, all over the country. We didn't occupy them most probably because we had no army or police division that was both loyal to us and well informed. 15
The later policy of 'lustration', which went further in Czechslovakia than anywhere else except Germany, was introduced substantially because of fears of a communist come-back (Wheaton and Kavan, 1992: 179-182 We talked a lot at the time about setting up a kind of 'ethical tribunal'
to render a verdict on the moral and political responsibility for conditions under the previous regime, but there obviously wasn't the appetite, or even the energy, for that.
The saddest thing of all is our miserable record in successfully prosecuting actual crimes. The state of our judiciary was clearly a factor here.
On the second issue, the replacement of central planning by a market economy, there were more open choices over the speed and modalities of the transition. 16 Here, the picture rapidly becomes complicated by the intrusion of outside 'experts' and, eventually, of the European Union. We are entering, in other words, a terrain well mapped by analysts such as Janine Wedel (1998) for the 'advice industry' and Wade Jacoby's analyses of processes of imitation or 'ordering from the menu' (Jacoby, 2000 (Jacoby, , 2002 (Jacoby, , 2004 .
As Larry Ray and I have argued Ray 2004), 1989 was in at least one way a bad time for the revolutions: the neoliberal heyday meant that economic policies were quite unnecessarily destructive and the prospect of a second Marshall
Plan for postcommunist Europe rapidly faded. There was, however, quite a lot of talk of such a thing; Janine Wedel (1998: 29-30) The EU, like the West as a whole, was slow to respond to the needs of post-1989
Europe, but its long-term impact has been massively beneficial overall. Unlike the situation in Western Europe, no postcommunist state has rejected the option of membership and none seems likely to. Having reinforced differences between
postcommunist states in what has been aptly called the 'regatta' towards accession, the challenge for the Union is to develop common policies to reduce the dangerous inequalities which persist between member states. EU accession has often been taken as a marker for the end of postcommunist transition, and with border-free travel, currencies pegged to, or already replaced by, the Euro, it is easy to slip into this way of thinking. But we need also to bear in mind the persistence of the past, both in the theme of postcommunism as a 'return' to capitalism, national independence and so on (Lagerspetz, 1999) and in the viscosity of social structures which was so often overlooked in the early 1990s. The postcommunist or postsocialist condition remains determinant (Stenning and Hörschelmann, 2008; Ray, 2009 ).
To cut a long story short, then, the role of the EU is increasingly crucial as the postcommunist decades unfold. While I am not concerned with the minutiae of enlargement and accession, they are clearly at the heart of the processes examined here -first as a long-term prospect (except of course in Germany) and then as a more or less imminent reality, drawing one state or group of states after another into the acquis communautaire or the backwash which it creates for those outside. The question of what sort of Europe is emerging in the twenty-first century is not reducible to a set of questions about the evolution of the European Union, as it is in some of the more EUrocentric literature, but the political shape of the more or less united Europe which is emerging cannot but be a central concern. 18 As Sobrina Edwards (2005; It's become bad form to mention it, because we are meant to be friendly towards the newest members of the European Union. But the truth is that several of these 'emerging democracies' have reverted to a brand of ultra-nationalistic politics that would repel most voters in western Europe. It exists in Poland and Latvia, but also Lithuania, Estonia, Hungary, Romania and beyond.
Since this was the same month in which a British neofascist leader was given a prominent place on a television programme, it is important to stress that this is a problem for Europe as a whole and not just for postcommunist Europe. At the risk of trivialising an important issue, I suggest we apply to postcommunist politics, and that of Europe as a whole, what I call the BBB test, referring not to A Level grades required for university admission but whether a particular political leader is a bigger bastard than Berlusconi. Several suspect postcommunist politicians indeed pass this test, but others fall mercifully short.
To draw a provisional conclusion, it may be that the search for a Stunde Null is fruitless, except through the benefits of the search itself. Postcommunist states are perhaps less like trains, switching at a precise point from one track to another, than planes or ships which can make ongoing course changes. It remains the case that postcommunist Europe offers the spectacle of a wide variety of countries and regions emerging from a relatively similar state into one which is a good deal more open, yet shaped by the past and by underlying structures and contingent events in all sorts of different ways. 'There is no way I will be a laboratory rabbit for any new experiment', said an East German emigrant in late 1989 to William Echikson (1990: 25) , explaining his unwillingness to return even to a changed GDR. The sentiment is entirely understandable, but the predicament inescapable for those who remained.
Postcommunist transition, even in Germany, could not but take the form of an experiment -for better or worse for those embedded in it, but to the undoubted benefit of comparative researchers.
